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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

25X1

FROM:

John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
Room 7D24, Headquarters

EXTENSION

NO.

DDA 77-1484

DATE

18 March 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1

Room 345
Old EOB

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25X1

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Director of Central
Intelligence

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As regards the attached, we have deliberately given you background papers which relate to our relationships with various aspects of American society. It should be noted, however, which is the last attachment to this paper does cover these issues.

John F. Blake

Atts
As Stated

25X1

25X1



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DDA 77-1484

18 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Material Relating to
Guidelines on Employee Conduct and
Specific Policies Relating to the 25X1
Media, Academia and Clergy

1. In response to the verbal request of Commander 25X1
[redacted] this date, I have attached hereto a copy of
the [redacted] entitled "Handbook of Re-
quired Regulatory Readings." This handbook attempts to
summarize Agency regulatory issuances pertaining to employee
activities and conduct. It will be noted that the forward-
ing letter of the handbook requires that it be circulated
annually in the month of October. It is being updated and
a fully current version will be available for circulation 25X1
this year.

2. Also attached are copies of selected basic policy
papers relating to relationships between the Agency and the
media, academia and clergy. Both regulatory issuances and
letters and memoranda reflecting Agency policy are attached
and, therefore, a certain duplication exists among the various
papers. 25X1

3. Lastly, I have attached a copy of [redacted]
[redacted] which was promulgated in April 1976 and which
incorporates the provisions of Executive Order 11905 as they
relate to restrictions on intelligence activities, previously
existing Agency regulatory restrictions on certain activities,
and further restrictions which had been disseminated by DCI
memoranda. This document, when taken together with those in
paragraphs 1 and 2 above, represents a core of Agency pub-
lished papers pertaining to restrictions on our activities.

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John F. Blake 25X1

Attachments: a/s

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Media

DD/A Registry
File *Security*

Executive Registry

76-2188/3

DD/A Registry

76-3586

J-6

May 18, 1976

Mr. James Reston
Vice President
The New York Times
1920 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Scotty,

Your April 28th article on newsmen and intelligence, which belatedly came to my attention on May 10th via a copy of the London Times, prompts me to write you in hopes of clarifying a few of the points raised in your article, and to offer my views on others. I am also attaching a copy of my 11 February 1976 statement, in case you do not have one at hand.

It was your question to Bill Colby at lunch over two years ago that started us off on a chain of reconsiderations and actions which ultimately led to our new policy on newsmen and clergymen which I announced on February 11th. I think where we now are is a great improvement over where we were when you asked my predecessor about newsmen and intelligence. We have you to thank for having been the catalyst to persuade the Agency to reassess the practices of the past. That is one of the reasons I am distressed to find you are still ill at ease.

Another reason I am distressed that you continue to have strong feelings on the subject is the response I have had to our statement from some of the top men in your profession. Recently in New York a senior national media man told me that on the whole, he felt that our statement was all that could be demanded of us. I was gratified to hear that. As a new arrival in the intelligence business, I feel that I am not laden with all the professional intelligence officer's baggage and preconceptions; but I, too, think that is all that can be demanded of us. I have talked about this reform before the ASNE and the Overseas Press Club. In the questions I get after these and other talks, I cannot say that I detect total happiness but I do feel that there is an awareness that we have honestly tried to come up with a good solution to a very rough problem.

In your article you note that our continuing practices, as reported and commented upon by the Senate Select Committee, raise "troubling questions." Your article also suggests that we make known, at least in private to the organizations concerned, the identities of individuals and other entities who have cooperated with us. Let me address this latter point first.

Scotty, I simply cannot reveal the identities of any sources who have worked with us. From a profession whose members will go to jail rather than reveal a source, I ask understanding. But beyond that I have a very clear responsibility under the law to protect our sources, and the President restated and reemphasized that responsibility in his recent Executive Order. Even more "troubling questions" would evolve if I were forced to reveal the identities of those patriotic people and organizations who, in good faith and in different times, undertook to assist their Government in an individual capacity with the understanding and assurance that their contributions would remain forever secret.

I am also firm in my belief that there is nothing iniquitous about our continuing practices. I can assure you we are not trying to subvert the press. There are two aspects of this which seem to concern you, the first being the apparent discrepancy between our assurances that we were no longer using staff members of the U.S. major media and the Senate Committee "findings" that two such relationships continued to exist at the time of my February 11th policy statement. We disagree with this "finding." The Committee made the finding working from brief and necessarily highly sanitized case summaries, and over our protest chose to place these two cases in the category which Bill Colby had excluded from operational use not long after his discussion with you on this subject. I am convinced that we are in the right on this, even if I can't convince our critics.

On the other aspect of our continuing practices - our need to continue some existing relationships and to seek others - I stress that none of these have or will have any accredited correspondent relationship with any general circulation or mass U.S. media organization. Neither will we direct nor encourage them to attempt to publish anything in the U.S. media. Free lancers who may cooperate with us in some way obviously are free to publish their own material wherever they can get the best return. We cannot interfere with that process and we do not guide it in any way.


This leads me to comment on your bewilderment as to why President Ford doesn't simply "issue an order" to "stop the practice" of our making use of individuals who choose to assist us, and whom I have invited to assist us on a voluntary and unpaid basis should they see their way clear to do so. In my February 11th statement, I recognized the special status afforded the press under the Constitution. I'm sure you would agree that this special status exists, but at what point would you begin to infringe upon the rights of the individual? Certainly, many members of the press would support your ideas - but I am equally convinced that many would oppose any policy which they might feel would be an intrusion of their individual rights, an infringement of the freedom you are trying to protect.

Even the Senate Select Committee recognized this problem, and though they did not address it in their report specifically in terms of newsmen they do make the point that they do not recommend legislation prohibiting cooperation with the CIA by individuals in private institutions. The Committee viewed such legislation as both unenforceable and in itself an intrusion on the privacy and integrity of those concerned.

The CIA will adhere diligently to the restrictions I have placed on our relationships with newsmen. I can assure you of that. In any case, the question of "fall out" and "misleading the public" is not an issue, and has never been a significant factor in our past relationships with American newsmen. We simply have not worked with these people in that way.

I seek your understanding of the degree of change that has taken place--and I note your role in it. Although we cannot conduct our country's intelligence business the way each critic would like it to be conducted, I hope you will come to the conclusion we have made significant changes.

Sincerely,


George Bush

*good catching a glimpse of
you at the French Gala*

3

DDO/ADCI/kgf/18 May 1976

Distribution:

1 - Orig - Addressee

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

11 February 1976

Office of the Assistant to the Director
(703) 351-7676
(703) 687-6931 (night)

STATEMENT

Over the years, the CIA has had relationships with individuals in many walks of American life. These relationships, many of a voluntary and unpaid nature, have reflected the desire of Americans to help their country. Such relationships have been conducted by the Agency with the clear intent of furthering its foreign intelligence mission and have not been aimed at influencing or improperly acting on any American institution.

Genuine concern has recently been expressed about CIA relations with newsmen and churchmen. The Agency does not believe there has been any impropriety on its part in the limited use made of persons connected in some way with American media, church and missionary organizations. Nonetheless, CIA recognizes the special status afforded these institutions under our Constitution and in order to avoid any appearance of improper use by the Agency, the

-2-

DCI has decided on a revised policy to govern Agency relations with these groups:

-- Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station.

-- As soon as feasible, the Agency will bring existing relationships with individuals in these groups into conformity with this new policy.

-- CIA has no secret paid or contractual relationship with any American clergyman or missionary. This practice will be continued as a matter of policy.

CIA recognizes that members of these groups may wish to provide information to the CIA on matters of foreign intelligence of interest to the U.S. Government. The CIA will continue to welcome information volunteered by such individuals.

It is Agency policy not to divulge the names of cooperating Americans. In this regard CIA will not make public, now or in the future, the names of any cooperating journalists or churchmen.

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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied

Academia

The Director
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

23 FEB 1977

Ms. Mindi Keirnan
Editor
Independent Florida Alligator
P.O. Box 14257, University Station
Gainesville, Florida 32604

Dear Ms. Keirnan,

In connection with your letter of January 26, question 10 asks the Central Intelligence Agency's views on the question of academic freedom versus "CIA activities on campus."

The Central Intelligence Agency has several kinds of relationships with scholars and scholarly institutions. They include negotiated contracts for scientific research and development, contracts for social science research on the many matters that affect foreign policy, paid and unpaid consultations between scholars and the Agency's research analysts, and other contracts with individuals who have traveled abroad or desire to help us fulfill our primary responsibility: to provide the President and policymakers of our government with the best possible information on and assessments of foreign developments.

We seek the voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the foreign policy processes of the United States. Those who help are expressing a freedom of choice. Occasionally such relationships are confidential at our request, but more often they are discreet at the scholar's request because of his concern that he will be badgered by those who feel he should not be free to make this particular choice.

None of the relationships are intended to influence either what is taught or any other aspect of a scholar's work. We specifically do not try to inhibit the free search for truth and its free exposition. Indeed, we would be foolish to do so, as it is the truth we seek. We know that we have no monopoly on fact or understanding, and to restrict the search for the truth would be detrimental to our own purposes.

If CIA were to isolate itself from the good counsel of the best scholars of our country, we would surely become a narrow organization that could only give inferior service to the President as well as the taxpayer. The complexity of international relations today requires that our research be strong, and we intend to keep it strong by seeking the best perspectives from inside and outside the government.

Certainly the government would be less able to act wisely in foreign policy if scholars and universities were to isolate themselves from government or government from the scholars and their universities.

In sum, our problem is to be certain that the relationship of scholars and universities to CIA is not misrepresented or misunderstood. I hope this letter will be helpful in that respect.

Sincerely,

Andrew T. Falkiewicz
Assistant to the Director
of Central Intelligence

STAT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

5 June 1976

Mr. John William Ward
President
Amherst College
Amherst, Massachusetts 01002


Dear President Ward:

This is in response to your letter of 17 May 1976, in which you levied upon CIA a Freedom of Information Act request concerning paid or unpaid contact between the Agency and any faculty member, student, or employee of Amherst College. This aspect of your letter has been referred to the appropriate office for handling under procedures designed to implement the Act. You will receive that response in due course.

You raised several other issues in your letter, and their tone suggests that you misunderstand the nature of CIA contact with the academic community. I note that you sent William Van Alstyne, President, AAUP, a copy of your letter to me. As you apparently are aware, he also wrote expressing concerns similar to yours. I believe that my response to him was clear, and I take the liberty of quoting here from that letter, dated 11 May 1976. I said,

"The Agency has several kinds of relationships with scholars and scholarly institutions. They include negotiated contracts for scientific research and development, contracts for social science research on the many matters that affect foreign policy, paid and unpaid consultations between scholars and CIA research analysts, contracts with individuals who have travelled abroad, and other similar contracts that help us fulfill our primary responsibility; i.e., to provide the policy makers of our government with information and assessments of foreign developments.

We seek the voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the foreign policy processes of the United States. Those who help are expressing a freedom of choice. Occasionally such relationships are confidential at our request,



but more often they are discreet at the scholar's request because of his concern that he will be badgered by those who feel he should not be free to make this particular choice.

None of the relationships are intended to influence either what is taught or any other aspect of a scholar's work. We specifically do not try to inhibit the 'free search for truth and its free exposition.' Indeed, we would be foolish to do so, for it is the truth we seek. We know that we have no monopoly on fact or on understanding, and to restrict the search for the truth would be extremely detrimental to our own purposes. If CIA were to isolate itself from the good counsel of the best scholars in our country, we would surely become a narrow organization that could give only inferior service to the government. The complexity of international relations today requires that our research be strong, and we intend to keep it strong by seeking the best perspectives from inside and outside the government."


I hope that the above statement is reassuring. Let me say that any employee of any school with whom we have had an exchange of views in his capacity as employee is free to acknowledge that fact publicly or to his college or university administration. My understanding of these matters leads me to believe, however, that while consulting with any part of our government a scholar usually thinks of himself as a private actor rather than as part of the institution of higher education from which he comes. Thus, he feels neither more nor less obligated to report his relationship with CIA than he would his consultations with other U.S. agencies, with U.S. and foreign businesses, or with foreign governments. Since we do not seek scholarly contact from particular schools, but rather reach out for advice from the best authorities wherever they may be, I see some merit in the scholar's logic.

I also want you to be assured that I do understand the important role of our colleges and universities in the preservation of freedom. Each institution in our society must make its own rules and policies about the conduct of its members. I seriously disagree with two of your points, however.

First, I cannot agree that secrecy is necessarily a threat to freedom--either to the freedom of the individual or to the freedom associated with true scholarship. Surely you would not argue that a professor whose research contributed to the development of a sensor that could warn of strategic attack is obligated to publish the research findings that make the system effective. I also hope that you can see the merit of secrecy that ensures the flow of vital information to the government by protecting sources and methods of collection. If you can accept that secrecy, then would you preclude a scholar who consults with the government from reviewing information that is protected? And if a scholar reviews secret factual details about a foreign policy problem, would you require him to reveal those details when he writes his next article on foreign affairs for a scholarly journal?

Finally, I hope that any policies or standards of ethics that you adopt for Amherst will include an encouragement to serve the society and its institutions. I believe that on his own time a faculty member should be free to consult or contract with the CIA or any other part of the government without fear of censure. For our part, we will never coerce someone to cooperate. Having said that, it seems to me that a scholar's conscience, rather than an institutional "yes" or "no", should determine his relationship with the government.

Sincerely,


George Bush
Director

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Mr. Knoche

C/Review Staff

ES Academic File

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry

76-7399/5

28 May 1976

P-1.4.1
16 Apr 76

Mr. William P. Bundy
Foreign Affairs
58 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

Dear Bill:

Some time ago I promised you a reply to your thoughtful letter. It has taken longer than I expected because the concern you express inspired me to ask for a review of our situation.

Your thesis as we understand it is that the overt, analytic side of the Agency should be organizationally divorced from the clandestine. This would open the door to a reestablishment of close links between intelligence analysis and the intellectual resources of the universities. Confronting this, we have asked ourselves four questions. What is the present state of these relationships? What improvements could be achieved by the divorce you propose? What would be its costs? Would the costs be worth the gain?

Let me say at the beginning that our problem of standing with the "mainstream" is much narrower in one sense and much broader in another than you imply.

It is narrower because the opposition in principle to clandestine operations is aimed mainly at covert action, and is confined to a relatively small but highly articulate and influential group. These critics are strongest in the major universities, and strongest there in the Establishment ones. With a few exceptions, they represent the liberal arts and social sciences rather than the physical sciences, and within the social sciences they do not include many scholars of Communist societies. On the other hand, your "mainstream" strongly

P-1.4.1
(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

influences the editorial (and the news) content of certain familiar publications, ones that are able to build a sort of prison of fashionable attitudes. When we deal with the currents of intellectual life outside prison walls, we find a great deal of support for the Agency and its mission.

On the other hand, the problem is much broader than intelligence. The "mainstream" has, to varying degrees, turned its back on defense and on foreign policy. A few will have nothing to do with government itself. A much greater number believe, with some justification, that our national energies should be concentrated on domestic problems. Their concern over intelligence issues is obviously great, partly because these issues epitomize for them the misdirection of American society. Nonetheless, it is more an expression of a broader legitimate debate over priorities and credibility than the underlying cause of the debate. We are convinced that acceptance by these people of the Agency, or of its present analytic component, as a respectable participant in American intellectual life must wait until they rediscover that guilt is no substitute for foreign policy in a less than benign world, and until they determine that it is respectable to participate and assist in national government. There are some encouraging signs that this is beginning to happen.

Even then, I concede, we will have problems, but not as great as you anticipate. The fact is that we have never been isolated from academia even during the worst of the recent period. In fact, we are less "monastic" now than we have ever been. The difference is that many of the people with whom we deal find it necessary to be circumspect if they are not to be hounded by the emotional and the trendy among their colleagues. For this reason you and many others are probably unaware just how deep and extensive these relationships are. They require the assignment of an officer full-time as Coordinator. Some examples, from the liberal arts and social sciences, at the risk of inflicting on you a statistic or two:

- You speak of the immense amount of contact that "used to exist" between the overt side and the universities. One Office alone, the Office of Political Research (formed when ONE was broken up), has maintained through all the nastiness of the past few years regular and active exchange:

At Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, MIT, Amherst, etc., with 39 senior faculty;

° At Chicago, California, Michigan, etc., with 41 senior faculty;

° At other institutions (including 6 foreign) with 32 senior faculty.

- You asked how long it has been since a scholar from the outside joined the Agency for a year or so. The answer is that there are two such on board now, and a third is about to join us.
- You note that our people used to be able to go freely to academic centers. This academic year we have 21 analysts on sabbaticals at various universities. Well over a hundred others, openly identified as CIA, have attended 60 professional meetings (American Political Science Association, etc.) and 30-40 presented papers or were scheduled as discussants.
- OPR and the Offices of Economic and Strategic Research all have panels of distinguished scholars to review their output and their programs. Many of these people put in a good deal of time at Langley.
- During the past two years, the Agency conducted three symposia to bring intelligence analysts together with academic leaders in the development of new methods of analysis in the social sciences. The first dealt with a broad range of new methodologies, the second and third with the specific problems of elite analysis and national leadership succession. Nearly 50 scholars from almost as many major universities participated. CIA sponsorship of the symposia was openly revealed, but only one person invited hesitated because of that association.

-- We have a summer intern program for graduate students. This year we will take 74, one out of every nine applicants. Experience suggests that about half will end up as permanent employees.

I think it is in the long run even more important that we are making a major effort to break our product out of its security wrappings. There is already a respectable flow of unclassified or declassified CIA product to the academic world. We expect it to grow.

On the scientific side, by now at least as important as the traditional intelligence disciplines, our relations with the universities have always been close. In recent years our activities in science and technology have grown enormously. A great deal of our analytic work is directed at technological developments and weapon characteristics. Similarly, we are deeply involved in research and development in support of collection and information processing, not only in the obvious areas like photography but also in the integration of technology with clandestine collection.

We draw for these purposes on the full range of American intellectual resources, and few scientists have withheld cooperation. We have contracts with more than 35 senior scientific faculty at major universities, and that many more serve as consultants. Among them are some of the country's most distinguished, including several Nobel laureates. Moreover, we draw on, and depend on, the work done at these institutions, and at research institutes and think tanks. We have full membership in the American scientific community.

In our experience, all but the most hysterical of faculty and students are sophisticated enough to make a distinction between the overt and analytic and the covert and operational, however much they may disapprove of the latter. While our analysts on campus have a great deal of arguing to do, they are not held responsible by their academic colleagues for clandestine activities.

Nor has recruiting suffered. We have far more exceptional applicants than we can take. Many of those that have joined us in recent years are extraordinarily impressive, not only in academic terms but also in professional or military experience. Neither you nor I are in a position to compare these officers with those of whom you speak, but my colleagues who know both groups tell me our newer people measure up. You are quite right, however, that we are not getting from Harvard and Princeton the liberal arts

graduates at the top of their classes. I wish we were, but the fact is that in the 70's these people simply do not appear to be interested in federal service of any kind.

Academic stars aside, the general level of our professional force is much higher today than it was in the 50's. The proportion with graduate degrees (and from first-rate universities) has risen from about 20 to about 45 percent, while the number with no degree has dropped from 35 (!) to 5 percent.

The mass and often indiscriminate intake of professionals in the 50's will not be repeated. It provided many first-rate people, but it also saddled the Agency with a large number of third-raters. Virtually all of these have been eased out in the last few years. With a smaller but steady intake, we are able to be highly selective, a policy that is paying off in the depth of talent and experience available to us.

Adding this all up, we assess our academic relationships not to be in bad shape, especially when we consider the strains to which they have been subjected by largely irrelevant events. Obviously they can be improved. In particular we want to have the very best people from the very best schools competing to join us, and we would prefer that our associates on the campuses did not have to worry over the effect their association might have on their students or their peers. A divorce from the Clarendon Services might help, at least in the latter instance, but its effect on recruitment or on our ability to broaden our present substantive exchanges would be marginal. Any positive change must await fundamental change in the fashionable view of what an intellectual owes to his country, something which we in intelligence can influence very little.

What do we lose by separation of analysis from operations? In our view, a great deal. It is interesting that the Senate Select Committee and its staff opened hearings largely convinced that there should be a divorce and ended, grudgingly, much less convinced. Its recommendation (pp. 449-451, copy enclosed) finally was that the new Oversight Committee should "give consideration" to this idea. Its objective, moreover, was primarily to relieve the DCI of a potential conflict of interest. The Harvard University Institute of Politics, Study Group on Intelligence Activities, produced a paper on this subject which is also quoted in the Select Committee's report (pp. 528-532, copy enclosed). I think the Study Group has the equities about right, especially in the dangers of placing the DDO in State or Defense, or of trying to maintain it in an independent position.

I would put even more weight, however, on the interdependence of the Operations, Intelligence, and Science and Technology Directorates. As you remember, the linkage between the analyst and the clandestine collector was once tenuous indeed. It is still not as close as we would like it, but year by year it improves.

In your letter you treat only with the substantive contribution that the collector can make. I think you downplay far too much the value of lengthy, on-the-scene immersion in a nation's politics, but there is an even more important consideration. We desperately need clandestine collection, but it is complicated and dangerous. We cannot afford to have it operate in a vacuum if it is to operate with reasonable efficiency and minimum risk. It must therefore be closely linked to the analysis function. The greatest value of this relationship, however, comes from the contribution of the analyst, not of the collector. The collector learns from the analyst what sources to seek and what questions to ask. He gets a continuous evaluation of his product. The analyst in turn gets a clear picture of the reliability and access of sources, and he can ask the follow-up questions. Thus, the collection process can be steered to make it more responsive to national requirements, and to make the ultimate product substantially more reliable.

I spoke earlier of the integration of technology and clandestine collection. The scientist who develops an advanced sensor, the clandestine officer who emplaces it, and the analyst who defines the requirement for it and depends on its success are all members of a single team. Experience indicates that the efficiency and responsiveness of collection suffers when it is organizationally and geographically separated from analysis. In the broadest sense, I see my managerial job is to make the Intelligence Community more "communal," to seek greater integration and cooperation among all its components. Fragmentation is not the answer.

In sum, we come out with different answers from yours on the four questions posed earlier. First, our external relationships in this country, while hardly ideal, are not in bad shape. Certainly they have not been so damaged that radical surgery is essential. Second, we doubt that the surgery you propose would cure the patient; our particular difficulties are symptoms of a more general malady. Third, we rate the costs and risks of the operation considerably higher than you do. Finally, as we add these answers up in May 1976, the costs do not seem worth the gains.

One additional point. I think you will find that the concept of an analytic function independent of policymaking is firmly lodged in doctrine. Our officers from top to bottom take

it seriously indeed. Had I any mind to change it (thus breaking a heartfelt pledge made at my Senate confirmation hearings), I would lose our best people by platoons. Nor are they unaware that they have no monopoly on knowledge and wisdom. They are encouraged to face outward, to seek information and advice wherever it may be had, and to engage in informed debate with their lay colleagues. And this exchange, even in these harried times, continues to be fruitful.

I do not wish to appear complacent, however. We have not had time to assess the impact on the public of the Select Committee's report. Its treatment of our relationships with academia has already produced some negative noises in academic circles. In any case, there is no question that the nation's confidence in its intelligence service has been shaken; restoration of that confidence is my highest priority.

For now, our emphasis is on seeking greater understanding in the Congress and the press. After a few months, we will take another look. If organizational measures look sensible, we'll take them. As you point out, these are not things to be rushed.

Again, many thanks for your letter. As you can see, we take these questions seriously. And it is healthy that we can debate them seriously with our distinguished alumni. I hope we can count on your continued advice and support.

Sincerely,

George Bush
George Bush
Director

Enclosures

RLehman:lm

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STAT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

DD/S&T# 2/24-76/1

11 MAY 1976

OGC 76-2468

5-12-76

Professor William W. Van Alstyne
American Association of University Professors
One Dupont Circle - Suite 500
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Professor Van Alstyne:

I received your letter of May 4, 1976, concerning CIA relations with the academic community on the same day that you released it to the press and gave a press interview about it. The fact that you did not await a response from me before making your letter public is somewhat troubling. Unfortunately, your doing this could suggest to others that your purpose is something other than the resolution of the problem you perceive.

Having said that, I firmly reject your allegations that CIA corrupts American "colleges and universities by making political fronts of them," that they "are made conduits of deceit" and that "faculty members are paid to lie." These charges reflect your ignorance of the true nature of the relationships we now have with American educational institutions and their faculties. To issue a statement that I am taking "steps to end the exploitation of the academic community," as you request, would give credibility to the series of erroneous assumptions and allegations in your letter. Whatever you have heard about the past, I can assure you that there is now no reason for the members of your association to fear any threat to their integrity or their high sense of purpose from CIA.

The Agency has several kinds of relationships with scholars and scholarly institutions. They include negotiated contracts for scientific research and development, contracts for social science research on the many matters that affect foreign policy, paid and unpaid consultations between scholars and CIA research analysts, contacts with individuals who have travelled abroad, and other similar contacts that help us fulfill our primary responsibility; i.e., to provide the policy makers of our government with information and assessments of foreign developments.



We seek the voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the foreign policy processes of the United States. Those who help are expressing a freedom of choice. Occasionally such relationships are confidential at our request, but more often they are discreet at the scholar's request because of his concern that he will be badgered by those who feel he should not be free to make this particular choice.

None of the relationships are intended to influence either what is taught or any other aspect of a scholar's work. We specifically do not try to inhibit the "free search for truth and its free exposition." Indeed, we would be foolish to do so, for it is the truth we seek. We know that we have no monopoly on fact or on understanding, and to restrict the search for the truth would be extremely detrimental to our own purposes. If CIA were to isolate itself from the good counsel of the best scholars in our country, we would surely become a narrow organization that could give only inferior service to the government. The complexity of international relations today requires that our research be strong, and we intend to keep it strong by seeking the best perspectives from inside and outside the government.

Your letter indicates a serious lack of confidence in people in your own profession--a view that I do not share; that is, your belief that your academic colleagues, including members of your association, would accept pay "to lie about the sources of their support, to mislead others, to induce betrayed confidences, to misstate the true objects of their interest, and to misrepresent the actual objectives of their work." It is precisely that kind of irresponsible charge that tends to drive responsible relationships away from openness and toward the secretiveness that you seem to abhor.

Finally, Professor Van Alstyne, the seriousness of your charges demands that we find a way toward better understanding. Because we owe that to both our organizations, I invite you to meet with a few senior officials of this Agency for that purpose.

Sincerely,

/s/ George Bush
George Bush
Director

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STAT

Clergy

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

File

Legal

OLC 76-1316/a

Executive Registry

76-2164/A

76-2477

17 MAY 1976

STAT

Honorable Robert J. Lagomarsino
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

STAT

Dear Bob:

In response to your letter of 5 May, I am happy to provide my comments on the matter raised by [redacted] regarding Dr. Mooneyham's open letter on CIA relationships with American clergy and other matters. This issue is of continuing public concern and I welcome the opportunity to reiterate this Agency's position.

While the CIA maintains no secret contractual relationships with American clergy or missionaries, and will not henceforth take the initiative abroad in soliciting voluntary information such individuals may want to provide to the U.S. Government, the Agency remains open to private citizens--including clergy and missionaries--who feel they have information of value to the Government and want to communicate it through the CIA. Thinking it might be of interest to you, I am enclosing a copy of my public statement of 11 February on this matter, which has been implemented as an Agency regulation.

I do hope this is responsive to your interests on behalf of [redacted]


Sincerely,

STAT

George Bush
Director

STAT





CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OLC 76-0778/a

6 APR 1976

CIA Registry
Legal

Honorable Mark Hatfield
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mark:

Thank you for your letter of 17 March 1976 seeking further clarification of this Agency's policy regarding contacts with clergy and employees of religious or church-related organizations.

I share your interest in assuring that the Agency's policy in this area is clearly understood by the Congress and the American public. This Agency's position on your bill, S. 2784, is being coordinated within the Executive Branch prior to transmittal to Chairman Stennis, but I do want to respond to the specific questions you raised in your 17 March letter.

The term "contractual relationship" is used to apply to any regularized, specific agreement involving services or information provided by an individual. In light of my 11 February statement, let me reiterate that it is Agency policy not to maintain any secret, paid or unpaid, contractual relationships with American clergy or missionaries.

That policy does not apply, however, to American employees of religious or church-related organizations who are not members of the clergy or missionaries, nor does it preclude relationships with such individuals as mentioned in your letter. Any arrangements of this nature would be private and voluntary and would not involve the use of their organizations or positions for U. S. Government purposes.



The policy restrictions apply to any person whether or not ordained who is sent out by a mission or church organization to preach, teach, heal, or proselyte. I am assured that American church groups have never been funded or served as funding cutouts for Agency purposes and I can assure that this will continue to be the policy of the CIA.

The ban on secret paid or contractual relationships applies only to American clergy or missionaries.

The CIA will continue to welcome information volunteered by American clergymen or missionaries. If, in the determination of a senior Agency official, such individuals might possess important foreign intelligence information, the Agency might initiate contact so as to afford an opportunity for channeling this information to the Government.

Regulations regarding Agency relations with American churchmen currently are being drafted and I will have forwarded to you a copy of this unclassified regulation as soon as it is issued. In the interim, Agency officials have been notified of the policies set forth in my 11 February statement. Your deep interest in this matter is appreciated and it is my intent that you shall be informed if there is any change in the policies reflected herein.

If this letter and our comments on S. 2784 are not fully responsive to your concerns, do not hesitate to let me know and I will be happy to discuss them with you at a convenient time.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

George Bush
Director